NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has made a striking claim: that if China were to invade Taiwan, Beijing might ask Moscow to launch an attack on NATO territory to keep the West occupied in Europe, thereby easing Chinese operations in the Indo‑Pacific.
This idea, which he presented in interviews and public speeches in 2025, has generated substantial debate. Below are several angles to understand what Rutte said, what evidence or logic supports the claim, what counterarguments exist, and what the implications would be.
What Did Rutte Actually Say?
In an interview with The New York Times, Rutte explain what he thinks might happen in the future.
He said that should Xi Jinping decide to attack Taiwan, he “would first make sure that he makes a call to his very junior partner in all of this, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, residing in Moscow,” asking him to keep NATO busy in Europe by attacking NATO territory.
He described this scenario as “most likely the way this will progress” if China opts for military force over Taiwan.
Rutte also emphasized that the threat is growing due to China’s military build‑up and increased coordination (or at least support) between China, Russia, and other states like Iran and North Korea.
Arguments Supporting the Plausibility
One of the reasons Rutte and some analysts consider his scenario plausible is that China and Russia have shown increasingly close strategic alignment in recent years.
They have exchanged diplomatic support, China has provided dual‑use goods (which can have civilian and military applications), and there is coordination (or at least convergence) in foreign policy regarding Ukraine and other global issues.
The argument is that China might benefit if NATO is forced to respond to threats in Europe, limiting how much assistance or attention NATO can give in East Asia or the Indo‑Pacific region.
Rutte also frames this in the context of deterrence: if NATO is strong enough and works closely with Indo‑Pacific partners, the hope is that such a dual threat would be less likely to be attempted.
Criticisms and Counterarguments
There are serious counterarguments to Rutte’s claim. First, it assumes a high degree of coordination and willingness on the part of Russia to engage directly with NATO territory — something that would carry very high risk for Moscow.
NATO’s Article 5 guarantees collective defense, meaning that an attack on one would trigger a response from many, including nuclear‑armed states. Russia would have to weigh whether such an attack would uncontrollably escalate into a broader war that could be existential for it.
Second, analysts question and doubt whether China would rely on or trust Russia to perform such a diversion.
While China and Russia have strong ties in some areas, historical mistrust, divergent strategic interests, and domestic constraints might limit how far Moscow would be willing to go in aiding China’s military adventures abroad in such a specific way.
Third, such a scenario may be politically useful as a warning or rhetorical strategy for boosting Western defense spending and alliances more than it reflects a concrete plan.
Skeptics argue that Rutte’s claim could serve to galvanize NATO member states, especially in Europe, to increase military readiness and budget allocations, and to strengthen ties with Indo‑Pacific partners.
According to Euro News, Rutte himself has called for a “quantum leap” in defense spending among NATO members.
Response from Russia
So, what does Russia think about this clam? Russia’s reaction to Rutte’s claim was largely dismissive and sarcastic.
According to Taiwan Political Reporter, former Russian president and current deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, mocked the idea on social media, saying that Rutte had “clearly gorged on too many of the magic mushrooms beloved by the Dutch.”
Such responses indicate that Moscow is rejecting the claim, whether or not it seriously views the possibility. China has not publicly confirmed any intention along those lines.
What If It’s True?
If Rutte’s scenario were true, the implications are profound for global security. NATO would need to adopt a more expansive posture not only in Europe but in coordination with Indo‑Pacific partners.
Defense budgets would have to increase significantly, as would investment in rapid response, intelligence, missile defenses, and multi‑domain operations.
The strategic logic of deterrence would become more urgent: showing that any aggression from China or Russia would be met with firm, immediate, and coordinated resistance.
It would also raise the risk of miscalculation: if one side wrongly interprets the actions of the other as aggressive provocations, or if Moscow or Beijing actually engages in actions that trigger NATO’s defense commitments, the risk of escalation becomes serious.
Diplomatically, it would put pressure on non‑NATO states in Asia and Europe to pick sides, or at least to strengthen their alliances and defense cooperation.
