Myanmar’s military government has announced that its long-delayed general election will be held in two rounds, the first on 28 December 2025 and the second on 11 January 2026. The second phase will reportedly cover around 100 constituencies, including parts of Yangon, the country’s largest city.
The announcement comes amid widespread international skepticism. Critics argue that the election is less about restoring democracy and more about consolidating the junta’s control after the 2021 coup that toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government.
As the dates draw closer, the question remains: is this election a step toward normalization, or a calculated move for legitimacy?
The Junta’s Motive: Legitimacy and Control
For Myanmar’s ruling Tatmadaw, the upcoming election serves a clear strategic purpose, reclaiming legitimacy in the eyes of the international community while maintaining full control over the political process.
- Searching for Recognition
After years of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, the junta views the election as a chance to project stability. Inviting election observers allows them to present an image of openness and constitutional order, even if the underlying process remains tightly managed. - Deflecting Criticism
By hosting observers, especially from countries with close or neutral relations, Myanmar’s military leadership hopes to soften global criticism. Any foreign presence, however limited, can be used to claim that the polls were “technically supervised” and therefore credible. - Managing the Narrative
The junta’s invitation strategy is likely selective. Rather than extending an open invitation to international bodies such as the United Nations or ASEAN, they may focus on sympathetic or geopolitically aligned partners. This controlled approach allows the regime to frame the election as “monitored” while avoiding meaningful scrutiny.
Global Context: When Observers Become a Tool
In democratic or post-conflict transitions, election observers are meant to uphold transparency, human rights, and fair competition. Organizations such as the European Union, Carter Center, or United Nations typically send missions to assess credibility, document irregularities, and ensure peaceful conduct.
Myanmar’s case, however, is unique. The invitation for observers does not come from a legitimate civilian government but from a military regime accused of widespread human rights violations. The aim is not genuine transparency, but validation, to portray the process as democratic despite the absence of political freedoms and opposition participation.
The military’s control over the Election Commission, media, and security forces raises serious doubts about whether any observer mission could operate freely. Even limited access could be used by the junta as propaganda to legitimize the outcome.
Between Legitimacy and Isolation
The upcoming election represents a critical moment for Myanmar and the wider Southeast Asian region. For the junta, it is a high-stakes gamble to restore a sense of normalcy and push for international recognition. For the opposition and the global community, it is a reminder of the fragile state of democracy in Myanmar.
ASEAN, which has struggled to address the post-coup crisis through its Five-Point Consensus, faces renewed pressure to respond. Whether the bloc decides to engage with or distance itself from the 2025–2026 elections will signal how far it is willing to go in balancing non-intervention with principled diplomacy.
As Myanmar prepares for an election that could redefine its political future, one truth remains clear: legitimacy cannot be manufactured through ballots alone. It must be earned through trust, inclusivity, and the return of civilian power, conditions that remain far from reach.
