Indonesia-China defense relations have recently entered a new phase characterized by an escalation of strategic cooperation across various sectors. In August 2026, the two nations held a ‘2+2’ meeting in Jakarta, bringing together their respective foreign and defense ministers signaling a shared commitment to strengthening their partnership amidst increasingly complex regional dynamics.
Adhering to its free and active foreign policy, Indonesia faces the challenge of balancing cooperation with China, a major power with overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea while simultaneously maintaining ties with traditional partners such as the United States and Australia.
This article analyzes Indonesia-China defense diplomacy through the framework of strategic hedging, a strategy employed by middle powers to avoid over-reliance on a single major power by fostering cooperation with a variety of actors.
In this context, defense cooperation between Indonesia and China offers opportunities for capacity building and technology transfer, yet it also presents serious challenges regarding interoperability, regional trust, and the risk of military fragmentation.
Concrete Forms of Defense Cooperation
The most significant development in the defense relationship between the two nations is the establishment of a ministerial-level ‘2+2’ dialogue mechanism, first held in Beijing in April 2025 and subsequently in Jakarta in August 2026. The Chinese government has described this mechanism as the first ‘2+2’ format it has established with another country.
During the August 2026 meeting, both sides agreed to strengthen military-to-military mechanisms between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), as well as to increase the frequency of joint exercises, including the Happy Garuda exercise scheduled for September–October 2026.
In the defense industry sector, China’s government has committed to technology transfer and the establishment of joint production facilities in Indonesia, including plants for ammunition, missiles, and rockets targeted to begin operations in 2027.
The state-owned defense enterprise PT Pindad has been identified as the primary partner in this project. This move aligns with Indonesia's efforts to develop a self-reliant national defense industry and reduce dependence on defense equipment imports.
Additionally, regarding defense procurement, Indonesia has confirmed plans to acquire up to 42 Chinese-made Chengdu J-10C fighter jets, with a budget of approximately US$9 billion.
This decision diversifies Jakarta's sources of defense equipment, which already include France (Rafale), Turkey (KAAN), South Korea (KF-21), and the United States (F-16). Indonesia's Finance Minister recently stated that the budget for the J-10C purchase has been prepared for this procurement.
Collaboration Opportunities
Opportunities for defense cooperation between Indonesia and China can be pursued through the modernization of defense equipment, joint military exercises, and the establishment of maritime dialogue to maintain regional stability amidst great-power rivalry.
First, this cooperation offers significant opportunities for technology transfer. As a developing nation in the Asia-Pacific with limited defense industrial capacity, Indonesia can gain access to military technologies previously monopolized by a handful of developed nations. Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin has emphasized the importance of technology transfer in developing domestic production capabilities.
Second, diversifying sources for defense equipment procurement strengthens Indonesia’s bargaining position and mitigates the risk of arms embargoes, such as those experienced in the past.
Pakistan’s experience, specifically the suspension of F-16 supplies from the US in the 1990s serves as a valuable lesson regarding the risks of relying on a single supplier. China reportedly imposes no political conditions on its arms sales, contrasting with the practices of the US government, which frequently links arms transfers to political agendas.
Third, this cooperation reinforces Indonesia’s position as a key player in the regional security architecture. China has cited the Indonesia-China defense partnership as a model for the Global South and major developing nations in pursuing new forms of defense cooperation. This recognition bolsters Indonesia’s status as a significant middle power in the Asia-Pacific region.
Challenges and Risks
The most pressing challenge is the issue of interoperability. The simultaneous procurement of fighter aircraft from China, France, Turkey, and South Korea creates a highly complex mix of weapon systems.
Each aircraft type entails distinct requirements for maintenance, engine support, weaponry, simulators, mission planning, electronic warfare libraries, and training systems. This complexity could hinder long-term operational readiness and maintenance efforts.
Further, regarding regional trust, the acquisition of Chinese fighter aircraft could potentially test the confidence of other ASEAN nations. Indonesia has long been viewed as ASEAN’s natural leader in maintaining the regional balance of power.
A move to engage China on defense matters could spark concern among neighbors, particularly those with ongoing disputes with China in the South China Sea.
Political challenges also arise from statements made by the Chinese Defense Minister regarding opposition to external powers in defense cooperation, remarks interpreted as a veiled criticism of the US government and its allies.
Although Defense Minister Sjafrie stated that Indonesia would evaluate these remarks in light of its national interests, such rhetoric highlights a potential divergence in perceptions regarding the nature of the cooperation.
In the South China Sea, while both Indonesia and China have agreed to support the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) and push for the finalization of a Code of Conduct (CoC), differences in position persist.
Indonesia does not recognize China’s maritime claims in the waters surrounding the Natuna Islands; however, it prefers to manage these differences peacefully rather than allowing them to become a central issue in bilateral relations.
Indonesia’s defense diplomacy with China reflects the implementation of a strategic hedging strategy within the increasingly multipolar Asia-Pacific region. On one hand, this cooperation offers tangible opportunities to enhance defense capabilities and diversify sources for defense equipment procurement.
On the other hand, challenges regarding interoperability, the risk of military fragmentation, and the potential erosion of regional trust require careful management.
The success of this defense diplomacy will hinge largely on Indonesia's ability to maintain policy autonomy and ensure that cooperation with China does not come at the expense of relations with traditional partners. Therefore, as underscored by its independent and active foreign policy, Indonesia should continue to balance its strategic interests amidst intensifying great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region.
