The Middle East region has long been at the centre of global conflict, and at the source of prolonged conflict of that vortex, Iran's relationship with the United States (US) has been one of the most persistent and dangerous axes of tension.
Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the two countries have been locked in a structural hostility involving ideological rivalry, proxy wars, economic sanctions, and military threats.
However, in recent years, although without major announcements, there has been a subtle shift toward diplomacy: indirect talks in Oman and Qatar, a prisoner exchange, and the partial easing of Iran's access to frozen funds.
This article attempts to elaborate the dynamics of the recent peace deal between Iran and the US using the framework of international relations and evaluate its potential for achieving peace and security stability in the contemporary Middle East.
The Roots of the Conflict and the Path to the Negotiating Table
However, to understand the current peace agreement, it is necessary to revisit the turning point in the conflict in 2015, when Iran and the P5+1 group (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, plus Germany) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Under this agreement, Iran agreed to significantly limit its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. From an international relations perspective, the JCPOA was a triumph of liberal institutionalism: mutually beneficial multilateral cooperation.
However, in 2018, the US under President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed severe sanctions, which Iran called economic warfare. The US also blacklisted the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Since then, Iran has increased uranium enrichment beyond the JCPOA limits, reduced cooperation with the IAEA, and strengthened its resistance in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. The two countries have come close to clashing several times in the Gulf and Syria.
Now, entering the 2024-2026 period, regional security dynamics have also changed. The Biden administration (2020-2024), while initially seeking a return to the JCPOA, has ultimately adopted a phased approach focused on de-escalation.
Meanwhile, Iran, under the relatively moderate leadership of President Pezeshkian, has faced severe economic pressure and domestic protests, becoming more open to negotiations. The result has been the emergence of what has been called a mini-peace deal, involving direct and indirect talks between state officials on the nuclear program, the threat of sanctions, and the achievement of regional stability.
International Relations Perspective
Through an understanding of international relations studies, there are at least three main paradigms that help explain why peace agreements can occur and why they are fragile.
First, offensive and defensive realism. Realists view state behaviour as driven by the struggle for power and security.
In the offensive realist view, as expressed by John Mearsheimer, the US and Iran are naturally bitter enemies because both are regional powers seeking to dominate the Middle East. The US wants to maintain global hegemony in the Gulf to secure access to oil supplies and protect Israel's interests, while Iran wants to become a major Shiite power and ward off US influence.
However, defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz emphasize that if the two countries reach a stalemate where the costs of war outweigh the benefits, then an agreement becomes rational. Currently, the US is overburdened by Ukraine and competition with China.
Meanwhile, Iran, while capable of causing chaos, is incapable of winning a conventional war against the US. Therefore, peace, driven by exhaustion from prolonged conflict, is the most logical option.
Second, liberalism and complex interdependence. The liberal perspective put forward by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye sees international relations as not only about states and military power, but also about economic interconnectedness, institutions, and technical cooperation.
In the case of Iran and the US, even without formal diplomatic relations, they share common interests: maintaining oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, preventing a nuclear explosion in the Middle East, combating narcotics from Afghanistan, and stabilizing Iraq.
When sanctions are too harsh, the Iranian economy suffers, but the global economy is also disrupted by soaring oil prices. Therefore, the recent talks facilitated by Oman and Qatar are a classic example of institutions acting as bridges.
Ultimately, by opening back channels of communication, it is hoped that the two countries can resolve practical issues such as prisoner exchanges or humanitarian access without having to resolve all ideological differences. The more technical issues agreed upon, the higher the political cost of returning to full hostility.
Third, constructivism and the enemy identity narrative. The constructivist paradigm, as articulated by Alexander Wendt, reminds us that threats are not objective but constructed by ideas, history, and identity.
For decades, Iran and the US have constructed a narrative of the existence of an absolute enemy. For Washington, Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.
While for Tehran, the US is the Great Satan seeking to colonize the Islamic world. This identity is so strong that even good deeds are often dismissed as regional political traps.
However, constructivists also see that identities can change. Shifts in elite political discourse between states are crucial.
When Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, approved direct talks with the US in 2024, after previously forbidding them, it represented a monumental ideological policy shift.
Similarly, in the US, when the discourse of regime overthrow shifted to one of restricting state behaviour, dialogue became possible. A peace agreement is likely to last only if both sides consistently construct a new narrative: not of good friends but of rational competitors.
The Impact of a Peace Deal on Middle East Stability
The continuity of the diplomatic trend in producing a formal agreement regionally, for example, a non-aggression pact or limiting uranium enrichment to below 3.67%, the impact on regional peace and stability will be significant.
First, a decrease in the intensity of proxy wars. Iran has been using Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and pro-Assad forces in Syria as bargaining chips and deterrents.
In a peace scenario, the US would demand that Iran rein in its proxies, particularly Houthi attacks on merchant ships in the Red Sea that disrupt global trade. In return, the US would halt its maximum pressure campaign and reduce its military presence in Gulf bases.
This would ease tensions in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, allowing for a more peaceful internal reconciliation process.
Second, stability in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain have been living in fear of Iranian missiles and drones. These countries have built a security alliance with the US while simultaneously embracing China and Russia.
Therefore, if Iran and the US reach a credible peace agreement, the risk of a lightning strike or incident in the Strait of Hormuz would be drastically reduced. Tankers could then pass through peacefully, global oil prices would be more stable, and Gulf states could reduce their massive military spending to invest in economic and social transformation.
Third, preventing nuclear proliferation. This is the most critical. If the peace agreement fails and Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even Egypt would quickly follow suit.
The Middle East would become a region of five or six nuclear-weapon states, each suspicious of the other, a nightmare for strategic security stability. A successful peace agreement, with rigorous IAEA verification, would negate that scenario.
Instead, it is hoped that a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East could be established, paving the way for safe cooperation in civilian nuclear energy.
Future Challenges
The process of pursuing peace and security stability in the Middle East is not easy, and the challenges on the ground remain enormous.
In Iran, hard-line factions within the IRGC are unwilling to lose their justification for resistance and access to the resistance economy. In the US, the pro-Israel lobby and neoconservatives remain suspicious and have no ill-intentioned belief that the deal is a ploy by Iran to gain sanctions relief without truly changing its behaviour.
If there is a change of national government in the US in the 2028 elections, or if the Iranian Supreme Leader is replaced by a more hardline leader, it is believed that the entire peace-making process could collapse in an instant.
However, from an international relations perspective, one thing is certain: the era of unilateral maximum pressure without dialogue has ultimately failed to change Iran's behaviour.
On the contrary, the gradual absence of constructive dialogue between Tehran and Washington will only accelerate Iran's nuclear enrichment and strengthen the axis of resistance. Meanwhile, gradual de-escalation, though slow and fraught with setbacks, is the only realistic path to peace.
In conclusion, the Iran-US peace agreement, if managed with patience, good faith and mutual trust, and supported by multilateral institutions, can be the foundation for achieving security stability in the Middle East today, not as a utopia without conflict, but as a commitment to reduce conflict in a rational and mutually beneficial manner.
