Climate change has transformed from a purely environmental issue into a multidimensional threat that touches on security, economic, and social dimensions. For Southeast Asia, a region surrounded by warm waters and boasting the world's longest coastline, the impacts of climate change are clearly not a future projection, but a current reality.
Indonesia, as the world's largest archipelagic nation and a natural regional leader, ultimately faces high expectations and complex challenges in bridging the regional climate and security agenda.
Rhetorically, Indonesia has demonstrated significant leadership. President Joko Widodo's commitment at COP26 to achieve net-zero emissions by 2060 or earlier, as well as efforts to reduce deforestation, are commendable.
Indonesia has also been a key driver of regional initiatives such as the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Climate Change, and previously the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change.
However, when rhetoric clashes with domestic policy realities, tensions arise. Deforestation continues, albeit at a slower rate. Forest conversion for palm oil and mining continues, and nickel down streaming policies increase emissions from coal-fired power plants.
This is a structural contradiction: Indonesia strives to be a green leader, yet its domestic political economy remains heavily reliant on carbon-intensive resource extraction.
How International Relations Theory Frames the Issue
Climate change in Southeast Asia is essentially a prominent non-traditional security issue due to its transboundary impacts, such as sea level rise, extreme weather, and food chain disruptions. From an International Relations (IR) perspective, this issue is analysed using several approaches:
From a realist perspective, Southeast Asian countries tend to prioritize national interests and sovereignty. Responses to climate change are often pragmatic, such as infrastructure adaptation, but multilateral cooperation is hampered by trust deficits and competition for resources (e.g., water within the Mekong River). Non-traditional security is considered secondary to conventional military threats.
A liberalist perspective, meanwhile, emphasizes the need for institutional cooperation through ASEAN and mechanisms such as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.
Liberals view climate change as a collective problem that can be addressed through international regimes, technology transfer, and economic incentives such as carbon trading. The role of non-state actors, including NGOs, scientists, and communities, is also significant in promoting awareness and policymaking.
On the other hand, human security approaches and critical theory highlight that the impacts of climate change, including floods, droughts, and crop failures, trigger social vulnerability, forced migration, and communal conflict, which then threaten regional stability.
Countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are particularly vulnerable, making climate resilience an existential security issue.
Taken together, these perspectives demonstrate that climate change in Southeast Asia cannot be separated from power relations, the architecture of regional cooperation, and global climate justice. A non-traditional security approach requires reform of ASEAN institutions and the integration of climate risks into foreign policy, moving beyond technical adaptation toward preventive diplomacy.
A Security Agenda That Remains Incomplete
Further, from a security perspective, Indonesia's approach to climate change remains soft, focusing on adaptation and technical mitigation aspects. It has not yet firmly positioned climate change as a non-traditional security threat within the ASEAN architecture.
Yet, empirical evidence shows that sea level rise threatens the existence of Indonesia's small outermost islands, which also form the boundaries of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Abrasion in the Riau Islands and the potential sinking of islands in the Strait of Malacca are not only environmental issues but also sovereignty issues.
Ironically, Indonesia has not consistently raised climate issues as a security agenda in forums such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus. As a result, the region's response remains sectoral, divided between environmental declarations and defence cooperation.
Meanwhile, existing ASEAN climate security mechanisms are extremely weak. Initiatives like the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) serve as a bitter example.
Decades later, transboundary forest fires continue to occur every dry season due to the lack of concrete sanctions. Indonesia, as the country with the most hotspots in the region, could have pushed for the strengthening of this mechanism as a model for other climate-security issues.
However, due to the sensitivity of national sovereignty, Jakarta has been reluctant to allow for more binding regional interventions. This is understandable, but the consequence is that the status quo continues.
The Gap Between Diplomacy and Domestic Policy
Indonesia's foreign policy is often inconsistent with its domestic behaviour. While Indonesia loudly advocates for climate justice at the UN and demands that developed countries meet climate financing commitments, it remains one of the world's largest coal exporters.
Fossil fuel subsidies remain rife, only partially reformed. If the country wants to play a credible role in Southeast Asia, domestic reform must run parallel to external diplomacy. Without it, Indonesia will lose the moral legitimacy to criticize its neighbours for their slow transition.
Indonesia also needs to play a role as a policy integrator between ASEAN and the global climate architecture. To date, ASEAN's relationship with the UNFCCC has been loose. Indonesia could push for the establishment of a joint reporting mechanism or a collective ASEAN position at the COP.
Such efforts have not been optimal due to persistent sectoral divisions and capacity differences among member states. Singapore and Vietnam are more progressive in their energy transition, while Myanmar and Laos remain heavily reliant on hydropower and coal.
Indonesia, occupying a middle ground, could act as a bridge, but it needs to move beyond the "mutual respect" style of diplomacy that often leads to the mention of threats without concrete action.
Toward a Human Security Approach
Finally, a human security approach needs to be prioritized. Climate change in Southeast Asia is not just about sinking islands or crop failures, but also about forced migration, resource conflicts, and the vulnerability of coastal communities.
In this context, Indonesia should lead the establishment of a regional mechanism for addressing climate refugees—a category not yet recognized under international law.
However, Indonesia's record in addressing Rohingya refugees (who are partly driven by environmental factors) is less than encouraging. Without consistent humanitarian principles, Indonesia's role will be half-hearted.
In conclusion, Indonesia possesses significant leadership potential in the region, but it has not yet fully utilized it. To become an effective actor, Indonesia must resolve its domestic contradictions between climate commitments and the implementation of extractive economic practices.
It must also boldly promote the climate change agenda as a core security agenda within ASEAN, including by pressing for the establishment of an emergency response mechanism for transboundary disasters triggered by global climate change.
Finally, Indonesia needs to bridge the gap between environmental policy and security issues, which have so far been largely treated as separate domains. Without these steps, Indonesia's contribution to addressing climate change and security issues in Southeast Asia will remain merely symbolic rather than transformative.
